Dejan Trifunovic

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics, Belgrade, The Republic of Serbia

In this paper, we present the problem of matching students to schools by using different matching mechanisms. This market is specific since public schools are free and the price mechanism cannot be used to determine the optimal allocation of children in schools. Therefore, it is necessary to use different matching algorithms that mimic the market mechanism and enable us to determine the core of the cooperative game. In this paper, we will determine that it is possible to apply cooperative game theory in matching problems. This review paper is based on illustrative examples aiming to compare matching algorithms in terms of the incentive compatibility, stability and efficiency of the matching. In this paper we will present some specific problems that may occur in matching, such as improving the quality of schools, favoring minority students, the limited length of the list of preferences and generating strict priorities from weak priorities.

Keywords: matching, Boston algorithm, deferred acceptance algorithm, top trading cycles

JEL Classification: C78

Economic Horizons2017, Vol. 19, No 2pp. 127-142. Published online 25 August 2017.
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